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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the 
most effective way of tackling the urban informal 
economy. It has been recently argued that the 
conventional rational economic actor approach 
(which increases the costs of participating in the 
urban informal economy so that they outweigh 
the benefi ts) should be replaced or complement-
ed by a social actor approach which focuses 
upon improving tax morale. To evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of these supposedly alternative ap-
proaches to tackling the participation of urban 
populations in the informal economy, we report 
the results of face-to-face interviews conducted 
in 2013 with 17,886 urban dwellers across the 28 
Member States of the EU. Multilevel logistic re-
gression analysis reveals that both approaches 
are effective in signifi cantly reducing the urban 
population’s participation in the informal econo-
my. When tax morale is high, however, the ra-
tional economic actor approach of increasing the 
costs has little impact on reducing the probability 
of engagement in the informal economy. The pa-
per concludes by calling for greater emphasis on 
improving the tax morale of the urban population 
so as to tackle the informal economy in the urban 
areas of Europe and beyond. 
Keywords: informal sector, institutional the-
ory, tax evasion, tax morale, public policy, urban 
development, European Union.
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1. Introduction
A long-standing belief regarding the development of urban economies is that there 
is a natural and inevitable process whereby an ever greater proportion of goods and 
services are produced and delivered in the formal economy. The outcome is that the 
presence of the informal economy in urban areas is commonly viewed as a leftover 
from a previous production era and as gradually disappearing from view. In recent 
decades, however, this reading of urban economic development and growth has been 
challenged. This is because it has been recognized that the informal economy is a per-
sistent and substantial feature of many urban economies (Williams and Windebank, 
1998, 2001).
Conventionally, a rational economic actor approach has been adopted. This views 
participation in the urban informal economy as a rational economic decision and as 
occurring when the pay-oﬀ  is greater than the expected cost of being caught and pun-
ished (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). However, the recognition in academic circles 
that many citizens voluntarily comply even when the pay-oﬀ  from working in the 
informal economy is greater than the expected costs (Alm et al., 2010; Kirchler, 2007; 
Murphy, 2008), has resulted in calls for a ‘social actor’ approach. This views participa-
tion in the urban informal economy as arising when intrinsic motivation to pay taxes 
– tax morale (Torgler, 2007), is low. The consequent approach is to elicit greater vol-
untary commitment to compliant behavior by improving tax morale (Alm et al., 2012; 
Torgler, 2012). On the whole, these two approaches have been previously viewed as 
mutually exclusive (Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 2014a). In recent years, however, a 
small literature has asserted that they can be used together (Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 
Hoelzl and Wahl, 2008). The aim of this paper, therefore, is on the one hand, to eval-
uate the association between participation in the urban informal economy and fi rstly, 
increasing the risks of detection and level of penalties and secondly, improving tax 
morale, and on the other hand, to evaluate the interaction eﬀ ects between increasing 
deterrence (i.e., the level of penalties and risks of detection) and tax morale.
To advance understanding of how to tackle the urban informal economy, there-
fore, section two reviews these rational economic actor and social actor approaches 
and develops hypotheses to test these two approaches, as well as their interaction 
eﬀ ects. Section three then introduces the data and methodology used to test these 
hypotheses and section four reports the results. Finding a signifi cant association be-
tween participation in the urban informal economy and the perceived level of pen-
alties and risk of detection on the one hand, and participation in the urban informal 
economy and the level of tax morale on the other, as well as complex positive inter-
action eﬀ ects, section fi ve then concludes by drawing out the theoretical and policy 
implications.
Before commencing nevertheless, the urban informal economy must be defi ned. 
The urban informal economy covers paid work conducted in urban areas which is legal 
in all respects other than it is not declared to the authorities for tax purposes (Aliyev, 
2015; Boels, 2014; European Commission, 2007; OECD, 2012; Williams, 2014a, 2014b).
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2. Literature review and hypotheses development
Recently, it has been widely recognized that although the informal economy is 
more prevalent in cities in developing countries (particularly in post-communist 
countries, Lazăr, Moldovan and Pavel, 2008), this is an omnipresent phenomenon that 
continues to persist even in the urban environments of advanced economies (ILO, 
2013; Schneider and Williams, 2013; Williams and Windebank, 1998, 2001). Review-
ing the literature, it becomes quickly apparent that there are two distinct approaches 
for tackling the urban informal economy. Here, each is considered in turn along with 
a review of whether they are seen as contrasting or complementary approaches.
2.1. Rational economic actor policy approach
The origins of a rational economic actor approach lie in the classic utilitarian theo-
ry of crime developed by Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, 1788) and Cesare Beccaria (Bec-
caria, 1797). This views people as rational actors who evaluate the opportunities and 
risks confronting them and obey the law if the expected penalty and probability of 
being caught is smaller than the benefi ts to be gained by breaking the law. This ap-
proach was popularized by Becker (1968) in the late 1960s who argued that compliant 
behavior would become the rational choice of citizens if one increased the risks of 
detection and sanctions confronting those who were considering breaking the law. 
In the early 1970s, this was then applied to tax non-compliance by Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972). They view those working in the informal economy as rational eco-
nomic actors who evaded tax when the pay-oﬀ  was greater than the expected cost 
of being caught and punished. It was thus argued to be necessary to change the cost/
benefi t ratio confronting them, which could be achieved by increasing the actual and/
or perceived penalties and risks of detection. This approach was subsequently widely 
adopted (e.g., Grabiner, 2000; Hasseldine and Li, 1999; Job, Stout and Smith, 2007; 
Richardson and Sawyer, 2001). 
Evaluating whether increasing deterrents produces law-abiding behavior is less 
than conclusive, some literature has argued that increasing the probability of detec-
tion reduces participation, at least for some income groups (Alm, McClelland and 
Schulze, 1992; Alm, Sanchez and De Juan, 1995; Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian, 
2001; Varma and Doob, 1998), and that increasing fi nes reduces engagement in the 
informal economy (Alm, Sanchez and De Juan, 1995; Feld and Frey, 2002; Wenzel, 
2004a, 2004b). Other literature, however, argues that increasing penalties either leads 
to a growth in the informal economy, has no eﬀ ect, or only a short-term eﬀ ect (Feld 
and Frey, 2002; Murphy, 2005; Webley and Halstead, 1986), and that increasing the 
probability of detection does not result in higher levels of compliance (e.g., Shaw, 
Slemrod and Whiting, 2008). To evaluate this rational economic actor approach in 
relation to urban economies, therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested:
Rational economic actor hypothesis (H1): The greater the perceived penalties and risk of 
detection, the lower is the likelihood of participation in the urban informal economy, 
ceteris paribus.
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H1a: The greater are the perceived penalties, the lower is the likelihood of participa-
tion in the urban informal economy, ceteris paribus.
H1b: The greater are the perceived risks of detection, the lower is the likelihood of 
participation in the urban informal economy, ceteris paribus.
2.2. Social actor policy approach
Since the turn of the millennium, an alternative approach towards tackling the ur-
ban informal economy has become more prominent. The argument is that individu-
als are not always rational economic actors possessing perfect information, but often 
misperceive or do not perceive the true costs of their actions and are infl uenced by 
their social context (Alm, 2011), refl ected in the fact that they voluntarily comply even 
when the benefi t/cost ratio indicates that they should not (Alm et al., 2010; Kirchler, 
2007; Murphy, 2008; Murphy and Harris, 2007). The result is that a ‘social actor’ model 
has emerged. This explains participation in the informal economy to result from a low 
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes – low tax morale (Alm and Torgler, 2006; McKerchar, 
Bloomquist and Pope, 2013; Torgler, 2011; Torgler and Schneider, 2007). To tackle the 
informal economy, therefore, the intention is to engender a commitment in citizens to 
self-regulate by improving their tax morale (Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007, 2011).
The origins of this approach lie in the work of Georg von Schanz (1890) who over a 
century ago drew att ention to the relevance of a tax contract between the state and its 
citizens. Six decades later, the German ‘Cologne school of tax psychology’ popular-
ized this by measuring tax morale among citizens (see Schmölders, 1952, 1960, 1962; 
Strümpel, 1969), viewing this as an important att itude strongly related to non-com-
pliance (Schmölders, 1960). Although this school of thought went into abeyance with 
the rise of the rational economic actor model from the 1970s, since the turn of the 
millennium, it has resurfaced (see for example, Alm et al., 2012; Kirchler, 2007; Tor-
gler, 2007, 2011). The intention is to improve tax morale in order to engender greater 
voluntary commitment to compliant behavior (Torgler, 2012). 
Through the lens of institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; North, 1990), 
which views all societies as having both formal institutions (codifi ed laws and regu-
lations), as well as informal institutions (‘socially shared rules, usually unwritt en, that 
are created, communicated and enforced outside of oﬃ  cially sanctioned channels’, 
Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727), tax morale can be seen as measuring the gap 
between the formal institutions (‘state morale’) and informal institutions (‘civic mo-
rale’). When this gap is large (low tax morale) the participation in the urban informal 
economy will be more prevalent. To evaluate the validity of this approach in relation 
to urban informal economies, therefore, the following hypothesis can be evaluated:
Social actor hypothesis (H2): The greater the tax morale, the lower is the likelihood of 
participation in the urban informal economy, ceteris paribus.
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2.3. Contrasting or complementary policy approaches 
At present when tackling the informal economy, a rational economic actor ap-
proach is widely adopted. Governments seek to increase the penalties and proba-
bility of detection so as to deter participation. Indeed, Williams et al. (2013) reveal 
that just 10% of government oﬃ  cials in the EU28 view reducing tax morale as the 
most important approach (most of whom are in Nordic nations). The vast majority 
view the most important approach as increasing the level of punishments and risks 
of detection. The social actor approach, therefore, has not yet emerged as an accepted 
approach since most governments view the rational actor approach as more eﬀ ective. 
Although some argue that this social actor approach is an alternative to the ratio-
nal economic actor approach (Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 2014a), the vast majority 
of scholars have asserted that these are complementary rather than competing ap-
proaches. In what is known as the ‘slippery slope’ approach, it is argued to be neces-
sary to pursue not only ‘enforced’ compliance by increasing the penalties and risks of 
detection and therefore the power of authorities, but also ‘voluntary’ compliance by 
improving tax morale and therefore trust in authorities (Kirchler, Hoelzl and Wahl, 
2008; Kogler, Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2015; Muehlbacher, Kirchler and Schwarzen-
berger, 2011; Prinz, Muehlbacher and Kirchler, 2013; Wahl, Kastlunger and Kirchler, 
2010). The argument is that when there is neither trust in authorities and authorities 
have no power, then the informal economy will be more prevalent. When trust in, 
and/or the power of, authorities increases however, then the informal economy re-
duces. Grounded in this fi nding, the argument has been that pursuing both is the 
most eﬀ ective means of tackling the urban informal economy (Kogler, Muehlbacher 
and Kirchler, 2015).
It might be the case, nevertheless, that simultaneously increasing the power of au-
thorities and trust in authorities may have interaction eﬀ ects. Applying higher pen-
alties and greater risks of detection might not always produce the same outcome. 
Where high tax morale already exists for instance, increasing the penalties and risks 
of detection might lead to greater non-compliance because of a breakdown in trust 
between the state and its citizens (Murphy and Harris, 2007). Put another way, in-
creasing the perceived penalties and risks of detection may have diﬀ erent eﬀ ects on 
participation depending on the level of tax morale. Until now, however, litt le evalua-
tion of these interactions and dynamics has been undertaken so as to develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the interactions between deterrents and tax morale. To 
start to do so in an urban context, therefore, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
Interaction eﬀ ects hypothesis (H3): The eﬀ ect of perceived penalties and risk of detection 
on the likelihood of participation in the urban informal economy is diﬀ erent at vary-
ing levels of tax morale, ceteris paribus.
H3a: The eﬀ ect of perceived penalties on the likelihood of participation in the urban 
informal economy is diﬀ erent at varying levels of tax morale, ceteris paribus.
H3b: The eﬀ ect of perceived risk of detection on the likelihood of participation in the 
urban informal economy is diﬀ erent at varying levels of tax morale, ceteris pari-
bus.
144
3. Methodology
3.1. Data
To analyze these hypotheses, data is reported from special Eurobarometer sur-
vey no. 402 conducted in 2013, which involved 27,563 face-to-face interviews con-
ducted across the EU28, of which 17,886 self-reported themselves as living in urban 
areas. Given the sensitive nature of the topic, fi rstly, participants were asked att itu-
dinal questions regarding the acceptability of various forms of informal work and 
their perceptions of the penalties and risks of detection. This was then followed by 
questions on whether they had purchased undeclared goods and services and fi nally, 
whether they had participated in informal work themselves. 
3.2. Variables
To evaluate whether increasing the penalties and risks of detection, and higher 
tax morale, reduces the likelihood of participation in the informal economy in urban 
areas of the EU28, the dependent variable used is a dummy variable with record-
ed value one for persons living in urban areas who answered ‘yes’ to the question: 
‘Apart from a regular employment, have you yourself carried out any undeclared 
paid activities in the last 12 months?’.
Firstly, to evaluate whether the perceived risk of detection infl uences participa-
tion, a dummy variable (risk) was used describing the perceived risk of being detect-
ed when engaging in the informal economy, with value zero for a very small or fairly 
small risk and value one for a fairly high or very high risk. Secondly, to evaluate 
how penalties are associated with participation, a dummy variable (sanctions) was 
used, describing the expected sanctions if caught doing the urban informal economy, 
with value zero for those asserting that the normal tax or social security contributions 
would be due and value one for those stating that the normal tax or social security 
contributions would be due, plus there would be a fi ne or imprisonment. 
Thirdly and fi nally, to evaluate the association between participation in the in-
formal economy and tax morale, a continuous variable (tax morale) was used by con-
structing an index of self-reported att itudes towards the acceptability of the infor-
mal economy based on a ten point Likert scale. This survey uses a range of six tax 
non-compliant behaviors (for details, Williams and Horodnic, 2015c) and therefore 
an aggregate ‘tax morale index’ is constructed for each individual. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha coeﬃ  cient of the scale is 0.86 which shows a good internal consistency of the 
scale (Kline, 2000). A higher index value indicates a lower tax morale.
Drawing upon previous studies evaluating participation in the informal econo-
my in terms of the important socio-demographic and socio-economic variables deter-
mining engagement (Williams and Horodnic, 2015a, 2015b; Williams and Padmore, 
2013a, 2013b), the control variables selected are: gender, age, occupation, diﬃ  culties 
of paying bills, people 15+ years in own household, children and region.
In the following analysis, only those respondents living in urban areas were kept 
for which data on each and every control variable was available, which totaled 13,324 
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of the 17,886 respondents who reported living in urban areas. Examining the reliabili-
ty of the data collected, moreover, in 93% of the interviews, the interviewers reported 
good or excellent cooperation from the participant, and average cooperation in 6% of 
cases. Cooperation was deemed poor in only 1% of cases. 
3.3. Analytical methods 
To test the proposed hypotheses a multi-level logistic regression analysis is con-
ducted. The analysis was undertaken in two stages. The fi rst stage was to identify 
whether a multi-level approach was appropriate. The second stage involved con-
structing a model with individual-level variables and country-level variables to un-
derstand their association with the likelihood of participation in the informal econo-
my and thus to test the three hypotheses. Below, we report the results.
4. Results
Table 1 displays that 4% of those living in urban areas in the EU28 reported engag-
ing in the informal economy during the past 12 months. Although this is a sensitive 
issue, resulting in this being a lower-bound estimate of the level of participation of 
the urban population in the informal economy, one in twenty-fi ve reported doing so 
in the past year. The level of participation, moreover, varies across EU regions. The 
urban population living in Nordic nations has the highest participation rates (6%) 
whilst in East-Central Europe it is 4%, 4% in Western Europe and 2% in Southern Eu-
rope. As previous studies reveal however, just because participation rates are higher 
among the urban population in Nordic nations does not mean that they have larg-
er informal economies. Much of this participation in Nordic nations is composed of 
one-oﬀ  and small-scale paid favors for close social relations such as kin, friends and 
acquaintances, as is also the case in Western Europe, whereas in East-Central Europe 
and Southern Europe, participation is more often composed of waged employment 
and/or informal self-employment conducted on a more continuous basis (Eurofound, 
2013; Williams and Horodnic, 2015c). 
Turning to the relationship between the participation of the urban population in 
the informal economy and the various policy approaches, Table 1 reveals the diﬀ er-
ences between those engaged and not engaged regarding their perceptions of the 
risks of detection, the expected sanctions if caught, and their tax morale. Those en-
gaged in the informal economy perceive the expected sanctions and risk of detection 
as lower than those not engaged; 31% of those engaged consider that only the normal 
tax or social security contributions will be due if caught compared with just 23% of 
those not engaged. Similarly, 72% of those engaged in informal work perceive the risk 
of being detected as very small or fairly small, compared with 59% of those not en-
gaged. Those engaging in informal work, moreover, have lower tax morale (3.4) com-
pared with those not engaged (2.2). These trends are the same across all EU regions. 
As such, urban participants in the informal economy across all EU regions view the 
severity of the punishment as lower, a smaller risk of detection, and have a lower tax 
morale than those not engaging in the informal economy.
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Table 1: Participation of European Union urban populations in the informal economy:
by expected sanctions, detection risk, and tax morale by EU region (N = 13,324)
EU 28 Western Europe
Southern 
Europe
East-Central 
Europe
Nordic 
nations
Engaged in the urban informal economy (%) 4 4 2 4 6
Expected sanctions (%)
Tax or social security contributions due 31 24 48 45 23
Tax or social security contributions + fi ne or prison 69 76 52 55 77
Detection risk (%)
Very small/ Fairly small 72 70 69 80 79
Fairly high/ Very high 28 30 31 20 21
Tax morale (mean) 3.4 3.5 2.6 4 2.7
Not engaged in the urban informal economy (%) 96 96 98 96 92
Expected sanctions (%)
Tax or social security contributions due 23 17 25 40 18
Tax or social security contributions + fi ne or prison 77 83 75 60 82
Detection risk (%)
Very small/ Fairly small 59 58 57 60 72
Fairly high/ Very high 41 42 43 40 28
Tax morale (mean) 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.6 1.8
To analyze if these relationships remain signifi cant when a host of control vari-
ables are taken into account and held constant, as well as the interaction eﬀ ects, the 
fi rst stage was to estimate a baseline random intercept model with no explanatory 
variables to identify whether a multi-level approach was appropriate. The fi nding 
is that 11% of the variance in the participation of the urban population in the infor-
mal economy was accounted for at the country level (Wald = 8.75, df=1, p<0.005). 
This indicates signifi cant variation between countries in the degree of participation 
of the urban population in the informal economy. Having determined that the mul-
tilevel mixed-eﬀ ects logistic regressions should be used, the second stage involved 
constructing a model including both individual-level explanatory variables and their 
interactions, and country-level explanatory variables, to test the three hypotheses. 
The results of this multilevel mixed-eﬀ ects logistic regression analysis of the par-
ticipation of the urban population in the informal economy are reported in Table 2. 
Model 1 reports the urban populations most likely to participate in the informal econ-
omy. This reveals that men are signifi cantly more likely to participate than women 
and so too are younger people, those living in smaller households, and facing diﬃ  -
culties in paying the household bills. Compared with self-employed people, howev-
er, both the employed and unemployed are less likely to participate. This, therefore, 
clearly indicates the urban populations that need to be targeted when tackling the 
informal economy. 
Turning to the policy approaches, the fi rst fi nding is that there is a statistically 
signifi cant relationship between the participation of the urban population in the in-
formal economy and the perceived level of penalties when other variables are intro-
duced and held constant. Those viewing the expected sanctions to be higher (i.e., tax 
or social security contributions plus a fi ne or prison) are less likely to participate (con-
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fi rming H1a). Similarly, those viewing the risk as fairly high or very high are less like-
ly to engage compared with those who view the risk of being caught as fairly small 
and very small (confi rming H1b). These results thus confi rm the rational economic 
actor approach; increasing the actual or perceived penalties and risks of detection 
reduces the likelihood of urban populations participating in the informal economy.
Table 2: Multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression of propensity
of European Union urban populations to participate in the informal economy
Model 1 Model 2
b se(b) Exp(b) b se(b) Exp(b)
Fixed part
Expected sanctions (CG: Tax or social security contributions due)
Tax or social security contributions + 
fi ne or prison -0.248** 0.0989 0.781 -0.591*** 0.192 0.554
Detection risk (CG: Very small/ Fairly small)
Fairly high/ Very high -0.609*** 0.1030 0.544 -0.518** 0.201 0.596
Tax morality 0.354*** 0.0249 1.425 0.304*** 0.0410 1.356
Gender (CG: Women)
Men 0.582*** 0.0936 1.790 0.580*** 0.0935 1.786
Age (exact age) -0.040*** 0.0030 0.961 -0.040*** 0.0030 0.961
Occupation (CG: Self-employed)
Employed -0.742*** 0.159 0.476 -0.737*** 0.159 0.478
Not working -0.602*** 0.161 0.548 -0.601*** 0.161 0.548
Diffi culties paying bills (CG: Most of the time)
From time to time -0.711*** 0.130 0.491 -0.706*** 0.130 0.493
Almost never/ never -1.085*** 0.131 0.338 -1.080*** 0.131 0.339
People 15+ years in own household (CG: One)
Two -0.280** 0.114 0.756 -0.282** 0.114 0.755
Three -0.306** 0.146 0.736 -0.314** 0.147 0.731
Four and more -0.359** 0.164 0.698 -0.360** 0.164 0.698
Children (CG: No children) 
Having children -0.142 0.106 0.868 -0.139 0.106 0.870
Region (CG: East-Central Europe)
Western Europe -0.047 0.260 0.954 -0.043 0.261 0.958
Southern Europe -1.091*** 0.322 0.336 -1.083*** 0.323 0.339
Nordic Nations 0.697* 0.361 2.008 0.715** 0.362 2.045
Interaction terms
Expected sanctions:
Tax or social security contributions +
fi ne or prison x Tax morality
0.0979** 0.0477 1.103
Detection risk:
Fairly high/ Very high x Tax morality -0.0262 0.0519 0.974
Constant -0.748** 0.323 0.473 -0.565 0.344 0.568
Observations 13,324 13,324
Random part
Country-level variance 0.248*** 0.251***
(Standard error) 0.091 0.092
Countries 28 28
Variance at country level (%) 7.01 7.09
Notes: Signifi cant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Analyzing the social actor approach, there is again a signifi cant association be-
tween participation and the level of tax morale; the higher the tax morality, the lower 
is the propensity to participate in the informal economy (confi rming H2). This mul-
tilevel mixed-eﬀ ect logistic regression analysis thus reveals a strong association be-
tween the likelihood of urban populations participating in the informal economy and 
not only the level of punishments and risk of detection but also the level of tax morale.
Is it the case however, that urban populations decrease their level of participation 
in the informal economy if a government combines the conventional rational eco-
nomic actor approach of increasing the level of punishments and/or risk of detection, 
with the social actor approach of improving tax morale? Model 2 in Table 2 examines 
whether these two deterrence measures have a diﬀ erent impact on participation for 
urban populations with diﬀ erent levels of tax morale. This reveals that the perceived 
penalties aﬀ ect the likelihood of participation in the informal economy diﬀ erently 
at varying levels of tax morale (confi rming H3a). However, the interaction term be-
tween the risk of detection and tax morale is not signifi cant overall (refuting H3b). 
To further analyze the interactions between the perceived penalties, the perceived 
risk of detection and tax morality, Figure 1 presents the predicted probabilities of 
‘representative’ European citizens living in urban area participating in the informal 
economy by their level of tax morale, and what they perceive as the likely penalties 
and risk of detection. Here, the ‘representative’ European citizen living in an urban 
area is derived by taking the mean and modal values of the other independent vari-
ables. As such, the representative citizen is a 46 year-old not working woman, living 
in a two person household, located in Western Europe, with no children, who never 
or almost never has fi nancial diﬃ  culties in paying the household bills. As Figure 1 
reveals, when trust in authorities (i.e., tax morale) worsens, the predicted odds of this 
representative urban citizen engaging in the informal economy is smaller when the 
power of authorities is strongest (i.e., the risk of being detected is fairly high or very 
high and s/he expects that the punishment for such a behavior will be to pay the tax 
or social contribution due plus they will receive a fi ne or imprisonment). This reveals 
the importance of increasing the level of deterrence to prevent urban populations 
participating in the informal economy in contexts where tax morale is low.
However, when tax morale is relatively high (i.e., below a score of six), increasing 
the power of authorities has only a minor impact on the probability of urban popu-
lations participating in the informal economy. Indeed, the predicted probability of 
participating only reduces when the perceived risk of detection increases, but the per-
ceived level of punishment has no infl uence on the likelihood of participation. As 
trust in authorities worsens (i.e., tax morale decreases) however, the power of author-
ities (i.e., the perceived level of punishment and risk of detection) plays an ever great-
er role in determining the level of participation. Indeed, it is only when tax morale 
decreases below a score of six that the power of authorities (i.e., the perceived level of 
punishment and risk of detection) plays a more signifi cant role in reducing the pre-
dicted odds of the representative urban citizen engaging in the informal economy. In 
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such low trust urban environments, the greater the power of authorities, the lower is 
the probability of participation, with higher risks of detection having greater impacts 
on reducing participation than higher perceived punishments.
As such, when tax morale is high, the power of authorities has litt le overall im-
pact on the probability of the urban population participating in the informal economy 
and only increasing the perceived risk of detection has a positive impact on reducing 
participation. When tax morale is low (i.e., above six) however, increasing the pow-
er of authorities has a greater impact on reducing participation, with increasing the 
perceived risks of detection having a greater impact on reducing participation in the 
informal economy than increasing the perceived punishments.
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Figure 1: Predicted probability of the ‘representative’ EU urban citizen participating
in the informal economy: by expected sanctions, detection risk, and tax morality
5. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we have evaluated the various policy approaches available for tack-
ling the urban informal economy, namely the conventional rational economic actor 
approach which seeks to increase the penalties and risks of detection, and the social 
actor approach which seeks to improve tax morale, as well as the interaction eﬀ ects 
of combining them. The fi nding is that the participation of urban populations in the 
informal economy decreases as the perceived level of penalties and risks of detection 
increase, as well as when tax morale improves. This suggests that both the conven-
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tional rational economic actor as well as the social actor approach will be eﬀ ective 
in reducing participation. These, therefore, are not alternative competing approaches 
but can be combined, as the ‘slippery slope’ approach has argued (Kirchler, Hoelzl 
and Wahl, 2008). However, increasing the power of authorities may vary at diﬀ erent 
levels of tax morale. Examining this for the probability of the ‘representative’ EU ur-
ban citizen living in urban area participating in the informal economy, the fi nding is 
that when trust in authorities and therefore tax morale is relatively high (i.e., below a 
score of six), increasing the power of authorities has only a minor impact on the prob-
ability of participating in the informal economy, and only in relation to increasing 
the perceived risk of detection. It is only when trust in authorities worsens and tax 
morale decreases below a score of six that the power of authorities (i.e., the perceived 
level of punishment and risk of detection) plays a more signifi cant role in reducing 
the predicted odds of participation in the informal economy. In such low trust urban 
environments, the greater the power of authorities, the lower is the probability of par-
ticipation, with higher risks of detection reducing the predicted odds of participation 
to a greater extent than higher perceived punishments. 
Hence, if participation in the urban informal economy is to be reduced, a focus 
upon improving tax morale is required. The conventional rational economic actor ap-
proach focused on deterrents is not everywhere and always necessary. This is espe-
cially the case in populations where there is trust in authorities. In such populations, 
increasing the perceived level of penalties and risk of detection has no impact on the 
probability of participation. The use of deterrents is only infl uential when tax morale 
is low. The currently widely used rational actor approach thus needs to be at a very 
minimum complemented by a social actor approach which focuses upon improving 
tax morale. What policy measures could therefore be used to achieve this? Viewing 
low tax morale through the lens of institutional theory as a measure of the lack of 
alignment of the laws, codes and regulations of formal institutions and the norms, 
beliefs and values of informal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990), 
two sets of policy initiatives can be identifi ed to reduce the gap between the formal 
institutions (‘state morale’) and informal institutions (‘civic morale’), and consequent-
ly improve tax morale and reduce participation in the urban informal economy. 
On the one hand, policy measures are needed that alter the norms, values and 
beliefs regarding the acceptability of the urban informal economy. These might be 
fi rstly, campaigns to raise awareness about the benefi ts of the formal economy and 
costs of the urban informal economy, and secondly, initiatives to educate urban cit-
izens about the benefi ts of taxation in terms of the public goods and services they 
receive for the taxes they pay. This could include introducing education about taxes 
into civic education in schools, but also lett ers to taxpayers about how their taxes are 
being spent, and signs stating ‘your taxes paid for this’ in hospitals, doctors surgeries, 
roads and schools. 
On the other hand, policy initiatives to reform the products and processes of for-
mal institutions are also required. Firstly, this requires policy initiatives to change 
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the macro-level conditions that lead to lower tax morale, such as increasing expen-
diture on active labor market policies to support vulnerable groups and expenditure 
on social protection (Autio and Fu, 2015; Dau and Cuervo-Cazzurra, 2014; Klapper 
et al., 2007; Thai and Turkina, 2014). Secondly, it requires changes in how formal in-
stitutions operate. Indeed, unless pursued, asymmetry will persist between formal 
institutions (‘state morale’) and informal institutions (‘civic morale’), and trust in 
government and voluntary compliance will remain low, resulting in relatively higher 
participation in the urban informal economy. These fi ndings, nevertheless, are based 
on just one dataset and are thus tentative.
In sum, if this paper encourages further data collection and evaluation of the dif-
ferent approaches used to explain and tackle the informal economy, as well as the 
interaction eﬀ ects of combining them, both in individual urban populations and other 
global regions, then this paper will have fulfi lled one of its intentions. If this widens 
the range of policy approaches and measures used to tackle the urban informal econ-
omy beyond the currently dominant approach of increasing the penalties and risks of 
detection, then it will have fulfi lled its wider objective. What remains certain, however, 
is that it cannot continue to be assumed that the conventional deterrence approach is 
the most eﬀ ective approach, especially in urban contexts where tax morale is not low. 
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